openhands
6cc45d7413
Second review pass covering security, performance, admin tooling and the public/room flows. All HIGH and MEDIUM findings from the audit are resolved; nothing in this commit changes the visible feature set. Authentication & session security - CSP is now set on the request headers in the proxy, which is what Next.js uses to derive the render nonce, so the nonce is effective. - 2FA: an already-enabled user cannot re-enroll, the setup endpoint is rate-limited per account, and confirmed codes are persisted so the second secret no longer silently never applies. - Password reset revokes the ticket, authTicket and all personal access tokens, and bumps the token version so existing sessions die. The same revocation is now wired into the staff-side password reset. - /reset and /verify return a stable error code instead of raw text; the mail lookups are ordered by id so duplicates cannot vary between runs. - Resending the verification mail gets a per-address cooldown on top of the per-user limit. - Issue API tokens with the narrower radio/ticket ability set instead of "*". Authorization & input handling - Mid-rank staff can no longer keep dynamically granted non-view admin.* permissions: existing grants are revoked by migration and the grant lookup is restricted to "%.view". Rank guards use the dynamic super-admin check. - Alerting a user is permission-checked and audited like the other tools. - Material mutations (giveCredits/giveDuckets/giveDiamonds, the admin user actions route, bulk user actions) are capped and rank-guarded, and bulk ids are bounded. - updateRoom / updateRoomItem write through a field allowlist, and items may only be edited through their own room. - Classnames reaching the filesystem are validated before use so a crafted value cannot escape the asset directories. - The word filter now also covers offline mails, guild forum threads and replies, and user mottos. - Media uploads are validated by magic bytes, /api/media requires the page edit permission, APP_URL must be configured once mail is enabled, and the diagnostics error route checks the fetch site header. Admin tooling - Secret settings render masked and cannot be overwritten with a blank or an arbitrary raw key; radio credentials are new password inputs. - Commandocentrum balance changes are audited. - Admin list pagination reads the caller's per-page instead of the max, and the log exporter caps offset and search length. Performance - Catalog translations are cached per module, with a cheap revision hash; the public online count uses a stale window instead of hammering the DB. - The cache warmup now primes the payload the home route actually reads. - TopHeader batches its queries into one round trip, and LCP avatars load eagerly. - motion/react and sonner are no longer part of the root layout; the nav dropdown and mobile nav panels are lazy client chunks. Anonymous visitors again get the navigation chrome, and public pages get an edge cacheable response. Accessibility - Nested <main> elements in phase pages became <section>; the page entrance and route progress animations are pure CSS that respect reduced motion.
71 lines
2.4 KiB
TypeScript
71 lines
2.4 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextResponse } from "next/server";
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import { z } from "zod";
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import { createErrorRecord, ErrorStore } from "@/lib/error-monitor";
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import { clientIp, rateLimit } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
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const schema = z.object({
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event: z.enum([
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"browser.exception",
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"browser.boundary",
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"browser.unhandled_rejection",
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]),
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clientReference: z.string().uuid().optional(),
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message: z.string().max(1000),
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stack: z.string().max(6000).optional(),
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path: z.string().startsWith("/").max(1000),
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digest: z.string().max(200).optional(),
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release: z.string().max(100).optional(),
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});
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export async function POST(request: Request) {
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if (
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request.headers.get("origin") !==
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new URL(process.env.APP_URL || request.url).origin ||
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!request.headers.get("content-type")?.startsWith("application/json")
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)
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return new Response(null, { status: 403 });
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// The IP bucket is rotatable, so also require the browser's own fetch
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// metadata: a script hammering this endpoint from another site is
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// `cross-site`, while a real in-page reporter is never.
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const fetchSite = request.headers.get("sec-fetch-site");
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if (fetchSite && fetchSite !== "same-origin" && fetchSite !== "none")
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return new Response(null, { status: 403 });
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const limit = await rateLimit(`cms-error:${await clientIp()}`, 20, 60000);
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if (!limit.ok) return new Response(null, { status: 429 });
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const reader = request.body?.getReader();
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if (!reader) return new Response(null, { status: 400 });
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const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
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let length = 0;
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try {
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while (true) {
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const { value, done } = await reader.read();
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if (done) break;
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length += value.byteLength;
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if (length > 16000) {
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await reader.cancel();
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return new Response(null, { status: 413 });
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}
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chunks.push(value);
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}
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const parsed = schema.safeParse(
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JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8")),
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);
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if (!parsed.success) return new Response(null, { status: 400 });
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const data = parsed.data;
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const error = new Error(data.message);
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error.stack = data.stack ?? "";
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const record = createErrorRecord("browser", data.event, error, {
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clientReference: data.clientReference ?? null,
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path: data.path.split("?")[0],
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digest: data.digest ?? null,
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clientRelease: data.release ?? "unknown",
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});
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await new ErrorStore().append(record);
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ id: record.id },
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{ status: 202, headers: { "Cache-Control": "no-store" } },
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);
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} catch {
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return new Response(null, { status: 503 });
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}
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}
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